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It is commonplace nowadays to hear claims about how the associational life traditionally 
confined to states has reached a global scale. Thus, for instance, Michael Walzer asserts 
that ‘There is today an international civil society, the very existence of which raises 
questions about the usefulness of the state’ (Walzer 1998, 3). Similarly, Jackie Smith, 
Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco (Smith, Pagnucco et al. 1997) edited a volume on 
Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics, and Paul Wapner (Wapner 1995) 
talks about ‘politics beyond the state.’ Nonstate actors have certainly become relevant and 
ubiquitous in the international arena. 
I think the ‘global civil society’ argument, however, is not warranted. Instead, I would 
argue that what we have witnessed in recent years is the emergence of a myriad of 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) working intermittently on innumerable issues, 
ranging from the environment, to land mines, to female genital mutilation. Although similar 
in some respects, TANs and global social movements (GSMs) are not quite the same thing. 
In this paper, I elaborate on this distinction and illustrate the emergence and development 
of a TAN, one concerned with international election monitoring (IEM). 
This paper takes form in the following manner: in the first section I elaborate on the 
distinction between GSMs and TANs, and suggest an unexplored way in which emergent 
norms might be adopted internationally.  In the next four sections I follow the evolution of 
the IEM TAN. Thus, the second section deals with the foundational 1986 Philippine case; 
the third section with the 1988 Chilean plebiscite; the fourth with the 1990 Nicaraguan 
elections, and the fifth with the 1994 Mexican electoral process. I conclude in the sixth 
section by evaluating the usefulness of the path of norm-diffusion which I suggest, and by 
discussing how the practice of nonstate actors has contributed to the redefinition of both 
state sovereignty and the international system. 
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What’s in a Name? 
What does the concept ‘global civil society’ imply? For starters, a denser social cohesion 
than the real existing one among nonstate actors at the international level—unless, of 
course, one adopts a minimalist understanding of civil society. Paul Wapner, for instance, 
defines global civil society as ‘as a transnational domain in which people form relationships 
and develop elements of identity outside their role as a citizen of a particular state’ (Wapner 
2000, 261). I contend, however, that definitions of this sort do not take us very far, not only 
because they are too broad, but also because they are misleading. By transposing to the 
global realm a concept firmly established at the national-state level, they incur conceptual 
stretching. As Giovani Sartori warned over thirty years ago, when concepts are applied too 
broadly they cease being useful (Sartori 1970). Global civil society is not a subtype of civil 
society, like bureaucratic authoritarianism is a subtype of authoritarianism. Global civil 
society is supposed to be civil society writ large. Instead of moving up the ladder of 
abstraction in order to avoid conceptual stretching, as Sartori suggests, many analysts 
simply extrapolate the civil society concept to the global level.  But this poses serious 
problems. Take, for instance, the question of the state. State and civil society are mutually 
constitutive; if one takes away the former, the latter vanishes (Migdal 1994). Thus, national 
social movements have been a fact on the ground since the eighteenth century, in large part 
because it was at that time that the national-state became the dominant form of political 
organization (Tarrow 1996, 7). The existence of global social movements, without a global 
counterpart, would therefore stand as a major anomaly—an anomaly that, I would argue, 
has not yet taken place.1 
So what do we mean when we talk about ‘social movements’? And what is the larger 
context in which they develop? David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow argue that social 
movements ‘are best defined as collective challenges to existing arrangements of power 
and distribution by people with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction 
with elites, opponents, and authorities’(Meyer & Tarrow 1998, 4; italics original). 
Similarly, Friedhelm Neidhardt and Dieter Rucht define a social movement as ‘an 
 
1 Claims about ‘The transnational phenomenon [being] older than the state itself’ (Ghils 1992, 417) are, of 
course, anachronistic.  
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organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups, and 
organizations, to promote or to resist social change with the use of public protest activities’ 
(cited in della Porta & Diani 1999, 3). The larger context in which this composite of 
sustained interaction and protest thrive is the state—as Marchini’s paper in this issue 
illustrates. And it is precisely the state-society symbiosis that produces what the resource 
mobilization approach calls ‘political opportunity structure’ (POS). 
Although POS is thus an eminently domestic concept it has been extrapolated to the 
international level. Thus, for instance, Jackie Smith has written that ‘transnational political 
opportunity structures influence movements’ capacities for mobilization as well as their 
strategic alternatives’ (cited in della Porta & Kriesi 1999, 18). In her argument, the 
existence of ‘supranational arenas’ seems to warrant talk about a transnational POS. This is 
because, as Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi have put it, ‘in the globalizing 
world, issues emerge which transcend national frontiers: the internationalisation of markets, 
nuclear fallout, the greenhouse effect, the destruction of the ozone layer, famine, poverty, 
international migration on a worldwide scale, women’s and minorities’ rights’ (della Porta 
& Kriesi 1999, 21). A (rather weak) POS might indeed exist in those issue areas, if we 
grant that they constitute an instance of international governance (i.e., authority), although 
it is clear that they are not quite the functional equivalent of the national state. 
But what about the social movement requirement of sustained collective mobilization and 
protest? If we take the first item out of the equation, we end up with nothing more than 
sporadic ‘contentious politics’—certainly not an international social movement.2 Lasting 
collective mobilization is not a feature of most groups working on some of the most salient 
transnational campaigns, such as the ones having to do with the environment or free trade. 
And if we get rid of the second requirement, protest, we would then have just some sort of 
sustained campaign. But public protest, as Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani have 
pointed out, is a ‘characteristic aspect’ of social movements (della Porta & Diani 1999, 14-
5). Many, although perhaps not the most visible, international campaigns do not involve 
open protest. The bulk of the activities carried out by Amnesty International, for instance, 
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involve working through institutional channels in a manner that can hardly be characterized 
as protest.3 Similarly, as Alfaro’s article in this issue shows, Mexico’s Zapatista movement, 
at least in its international dimension, might best be conceived of as a ‘virtual movement.’ 
So it seems to me that we can better refer to these and other nonstate actors as TANs. 
According to Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, TANs include ‘those relevant actors 
working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 2). 
Interestingly, TANs are not formed exclusively by nonstate actors, such as NGOs and 
religious groups; they might also include some state agencies, and even intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs). This means: 1) that TANs are not necessarily in an external position 
vis-à-vis the state (or the state system), and; 2) that they do not constitute an ‘international 
social movement.’ As Keck and Sikkink put it, ‘Because part of states and international 
organizations also participate in these networks, the process of negotiation within the 
emergent cosmopolitan community is not “outside” the state’ (216). 
Furthermore, unlike social movements, the focal points of TANs are events, not 
mobilizations (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 236). That is, TAN activists do not seek to maintain 
collective mobilization. The ‘emergent cosmopolitan community’ is seen as an alternative 
to mass mobilization. Activists focus on communication and information exchange. TANs 
can thus be thought of as ‘communicative structures’ (3). As such, they create discourses 
which frame issues in novel ways, thus bringing them to the international agenda. Take the 
case of ‘female circumcision.’ It was only after a network of women activists framed the 
issue in terms of ‘genital mutilation,’ which highlighted its aspect of castration, that it 
acquired new salience, which placed it into the international agenda (with the UN, for 
instance, emitting a series of recommendations) (20). 
A TAN is thus both a structure and agent. As the former, it patterns the interaction of its 
members, and infuses them with identity; as the latter, it puts forward specific policy 
proposals in the international arena. The key to its dual character lies both in its 
decentralized and horizontal organizational arrangement, and in the kind of strategies it 
 
3 This is not to suggest, of course, that any act of protest is coterminous with social movements. These 
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employs. The core of the network is not a bureaucratic apparatus of a continuously 
mobilized membership, but a small group of political entrepreneurs and, more 
fundamentally, the information its members exchange. The social nature of the information 
gathered (and constructed) becomes the raw material for a new discourse. This social 
structure is then enacted by concrete actors who employ a strategy Keck and Sikkink call 
the ‘boomerang pattern.’ As they put it, ‘When channels between the state and its domestic 
actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational 
networks may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international 
allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 12). 
Thus, for instance, the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina enhanced their cause and 
put pressure on the Argentinean state by resorting to human rights activists outside their 
county. 
By ‘throwing’ the boomerang, network activists thus become players on the international 
scene. The practice of TANs as agents helps redefine not only the role of nonstate actors in 
the international arena, but also the structure of the interstate system.  As authors from the 
English School noted decades ago, and constructivists more recently, the interstate system 
is not solely characterized by a Hobbesian state of nature in which only material 
capabilities, as such, matter (Bull 1977; Wendt 1999). At bottom, the modern state system 
is constituted by institutions and norms which infuse both anarchy and material factors with 
meaning. That is, a normative structure underlies the basic components of the state system. 
Although TANs are not state actors, their actions affect interstate politics. States are, after 
all, shot through and through with societal elements. Take the issue of sovereignty: from 
being a ‘principle’ for appropriate behaviour among states in the eighteen century, by the 
twentieth century, it had become a ‘territorial ideal,’ in which the focus is on the 
relationship between territory, power, and accepted forms of political organization (Murphy 
1996, 87, 91). This transformation had profound consequences both for the way states 
related to one another, and for the way states related to their population.  In a similar vein, 
as Sikkink has noted regarding the effects of TANs activity in the human rights realm, 
‘When the state recognizes the legitimacy of international interventions on the topic of 
sporadic acts might be better regarded as instances of contentious politics.  
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human rights and changes its domestic human rights in response to these international 
pressures, it reconstitutes the relationship between the states, its citizens, and international 
actors’ (Sikkink 1993, 414-5). It is then through the practice of state and nonstate actors 
that the state system is reproduced and transformed. 
That is why it is important to trace the ‘life history’ of international norms, and not just to 
postulate their existence. How is it that norms that we now take for granted in the 
international arena came to be what they are? Furthermore, what is the origin of norms?  It 
is usually assumed that norms are internalised by states. That is, that norms originate at the 
international system, and then trickle down, permeating states. Jeffrey Legro, Andrew 
Cortell and James Davis, have provided us with valuable insights about the mechanisms of 
norm-diffusion from the international to the domestic level (Legro 2000; Cortell & Davis 
1996; Cortell & Davis 2000). But how do norms make it into the international realm in the 
first place? Many might just originate at that level; but I suspect that at least some 
‘international’ norms have their genesis in specific countries. That is, some norms might 
require a successful instantiation in a particular state before they can successfully diffuse to 
other latitudes—and to the international system at large. The issue, though, cannot be 
reduced to a ‘demonstration effect’ in which in order for the norm to spread all that matters 
is that the state where it was first instantiated be a powerful one—although of course that is 
oftentimes relevant. But my point is that some norms travel and others do not, depending 
on their ‘fit’ to the international normative structure. In the TAN I trace below, for instance, 
the 1986 Philippine experience became foundational because its main motivation (the right 
to have one’s voice heard in the electoral process) resonated with the liberal aims of the 
Western world. A TAN pushing for the adoption of slavery, for instance, most likely 
wouldn’t have fared very well—because it wouldn’t have resonated with the wider 
international discourse. 
Taking this structural element into consideration, Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink 
(Risse-Kappen & Sikkink 1999) have recently argued that the process by which 
international norms are internalised by states can be thought of as a process of 
‘socialization.’ They develop a five-phase ‘spiral model’ of norm socialization: 1) 
repression and activation of network; 2) denial; 3) tactical concessions; 4) ‘prescriptive 
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status’; 5) rule-consistent behaviour (22ff). Risse and Sikkink’s model is useful in tracing 
the process by which international institutions encourage the spread of norms around the 
world. As they put it, ‘the ‘spiral model’ accounts for the variation in the domestic effects of 
international norms (6; my italics). Furthermore, the model is based on the prior existence 
of international institutions (19). Thus, the ‘spiral model’ reproduces the previous bias of 
taking an outside-in approach, in which the focus is the impact of the external environment 
on specific states.4 A remaining task is then to 1) identify those norms whose early phase 
was closely associated to a specific country, and 2) trace their diffusion to the international 
arena. That is, in order to complement the prevailing outside-in approach, we need to 
reverse the inquiry: inside-out. 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have developed an approach that points in this 
direction (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). They refer to it as the norm ‘life cycle.’ Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s life cycle model has three phases: emergence, cascade, and internalisation. In 
the first phase, norm entrepreneurs ‘create’ issues by ‘framing’ them.  This process might 
take place at the domestic level.  The crucial link comes in the second phase, for it is 
necessary for the emergent norm to reach a threshold, and then ‘become institutionalised in 
specific sets of international rules and organizations’ (900). Without institutionalisation, 
norm diffusion from the bottom-up becomes more difficult. Finnemore and Sikkink pose 
two ways norms might reach a tipping point. The first is when the emergent norm reaches a 
critical mass. That is, as more states adopt the norm, there comes a moment when ‘norm 
cascade’ begins (they suggest this usually happens only after one-third of the total states 
have adopted the norm). The second way an emergent norm can reach a tipping point is 
when critical states adopt it (critical states are ‘those without which the achievement of the 
substantive norm goal is compromised’ (901)). Finally, in the third, ‘internalization’ phase, 
norms work down from the international to the domestic level. 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s approach moves us forward by effectively tracing the origins of 
international norms. Its only shortcoming, for my purposes here, is that it leaves out a third 
 
4 Although at least two chapters in the edited volume (the one by Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, 
‘International Norms and Domestic Politics in Chile and Guatemala,’ and the one by Anja Jetschke, ‘Linking 
the unlinkable? International norms and nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines’) might be considered an 
exception to the outside-in approach. 
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way in which norms might reach a tipping point. This third way is a constitutive one, in 
which neither sheer numbers or the consent of ‘critical’ states is essential. In this path, 
norms cascade simply by ‘expressing’ a foundational element of the international cum 
domestic system. Since the element in question, for instance, popular sovereignty, is so 
deeply embedded into our understanding of what a polity ought to be (from a domestic and 
international point of view), it is very difficult for state leaders to ignore it. As R. B. J. 
Walker has observed, ‘sovereignty expresses and works to reproduce a specific relation 
between claims to difference and claims about the forms of commonality and structure that 
permit claims to monopoly [to legitimate authority] to have any meaning at all’ (Walker 
2000, 28). 
Hence, state leaders, willingly or not, talk-the-talk of the norm at stake. It might then be 
possible for a few, not necessarily ‘critical’ states to instantiate and thus catapult the 
emergent norm—making it reach a tipping point. In a sense, then, it can be said that the 
emergent norm was always there: both in the outside (the international system) and in the 
inside (the domestic structure) in a latent state. It is thus the nature of the emergent norm, 
more than the number or the type of states which adopt it, that is critical in this path. The 
constitutive way does not negate the other two; it subsumes them.  Once a norm is realized 
in this path, it spreads out quickly—with or without any the other paths being present.  My 
probe of the IEM TAN is intended to illustrate this third way, and to test its usefulness. 
The Philippines 1986 
The 1986 Philippine electoral process is the cornerstone of the IEM TAN.5 As Eva-Lotta 
Hedman has noted, the 1986 effort is ‘the most effectively mobilized and widely celebrated 
of election-watch campaigns to date in the Philippines (or anywhere else)’ (Hedman 2001, 
156). The network that emerged in the late 1980s stood on the shoulders of Philippines’ 
‘People Power’—and the muscle of that power was the National Movement for Free 
Elections (NAMFREL). 
Tellingly, the story of NAMFREL had little to do with processes of globalisation and 
regionalisation, or with the end of the Cold War. In fact, the origins of NAMFREL go back 
 
5 Not that this was the first instance, but for practical purposes it became foundational; cf. Carothers 1999. 
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to the dawn of the Cold War. Thus, after its debut in the 1951 senatorial elections, 
NAMFREL launched a wide-ranging campaign, which included election watching, for the 
1953 presidential elections. This early incarnation of NAMFREL relied heavily on the 
Philippine Veterans Legion, and to a lesser extent on civic and religious associations such 
as the Jaycees, the Lions, and Catholic Action of the Philippines (Hedman 2001, 66). On 10 
November 1953, with about 5000 members at polling places across the Philippines, 
NAMFREL not only obtained a high profile on the media, but also lend credibility to the 
electoral triumph of the opposition candidate (110). Two things are worth pointing out here: 
one, that the organization of a monitoring effort of this magnitude points to the existence of 
a solid civil society in the Philippines, only a few years after it had obtained its 
independence; two, that the civic efforts that crystallized on election day did not develop 
into a sustained organization or movement. Thus, elections were not monitored in the 
Philippines again until the late 1960s. And this was done by another organization, the 
Citizens National Electoral Assembly (67). Furthermore, this effort again relapsed until the 
modern NAMFREL emerged in 1983. 
The political scene in the Philippines of this time was substantially different from that of 
the previous two electoral processes. The regime of Ferdinand Marcos had become truly 
authoritarian, as was made crystal-clear with the declaration of martial law in 1972. 
Dressed in strong anti-Communist, cold war rhetoric, the measure came as a big shock to a 
country that had lived with more or less democratic institutions since the 1930s. Marcos’s 
‘constitutional authoritarianism’ (Jetschke 1999, 139), as he used to refer to his regime, 
thus gave diverse civil and political factions to unite against a common adversary: 
Ferdinand Marcos. 
Opposition to Marcos became so widespread that even his key international ally, the United 
States, began to put pressure on him by the mid 1980s. This was no small setback for the 
Philippine government, and certainly not an easy step for a U.S. administration concerned 
with its global battle with the still existing ‘evil empire.’ The (in)famous history of U.S. 
support for the authoritarian Philippine government is well known. For my purposes in this 
paper, it suffices to state that the United States began to abandon its traditional 
wholehearted support of Marcos in 1985. 
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But the role played both by foreign governments and foreign activists was secondary in the 
eventual downfall of Marcos. This was a domestically-crafted feat—one in which 
NAMFREL played a crucial role, as made patent by the legions of volunteers that 
participated on the 1986 electoral process. Ironically, the Marcos regime provided the key 
incentive for NAMFREL’s re-emergence. Two months after the assassination of opposition 
candidate Benigno Aquino in 1983, a diverse group of business, civic, professional, and 
religious leaders got together and organized what, one more time, came to be known as 
NAMFREL. The new organization was an ad hoc one, with no further aims than the civic 
effort to work for free and fair elections. It was also a merely civic (in the sense of not 
overtly political, and certainly not radical) effort. As Kaa Byington notes, referring to the 
1983 initiators: ‘What these founders had in common was a long-time interest in civic, 
rather than political, organizing, and some organizations that they jointly belonged to’ 
(Byington 1988, 37). But the backbone of NAMFREL was undoubtedly the Philippine 
Bishops-Businessmen’s Conference, an uncommon association of organizations dealing 
with matters as diverse as the bottom-line and the salvation of souls, which proved 
tremendously successful, however. Co-chaired by a Bishop, Antonio Y. Forthic, and 
entrepreneur, Jose S. Concepcion, the new NAMFREL first got involved in the 1984 
Assembly elections. On that occasion, approximately 250,000 volunteers participated.  
As the domestic situation deteriorated and international pressure increased, Marcos was 
forced to make some concessions. Thus, although presidential elections were not scheduled 
until 1987, in November 1985 he announced on an ABC news program that they would be 
held one year early. This otherwise welcome announcement took the opposition by 
surprise.  At first, it was reluctant to participate, but within a month it had agreed on a 
presidential candidate: Corazón Aquino, the widow of the slain leader. 
In this critical context, NAMFREL would become a key actor in the electoral process. The 
1984 experience lent NAMFREL credibility and widespread recognition.  It is telling in 
this respect that the ‘General Instructions for the Board of Election Inspectors’ for the 1986 
presidential elections had a section on ‘watchers’ (Republic of the Philippines, Commission 
of Elections, 1986; Republic of the Philippines, Commission of Elections, ‘General 
Instructions’ section III). Furthermore, NAMFREL was accredited as the citizen arm of the 
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Commission of Elections on 24 December 1985. Thus, with 500,000 volunteers on election 
day, as Gretchen Casper has put it, ‘Marcos’s modus operandi was constrained’ by 
NAMFREL (Casper 1995, 116). 
During both the 1984 and 1986 campaigns, as Hedman notes, ‘the rank and file of 
NAMFREL volunteers was filled in large measure by corporate employees and 
professional affiliates in many localities around the country’ (Hedman 2001, 117). The 
engine of this success was one of the co-chairmen, ‘Joe Con’—as the charismatic and 
hyperactive entrepreneur who became the symbol of NAMFREL was known. ‘Joe Con’s 
theory of organization,’ according to Kaa Byington, ‘[was] simple: network’(Byington 
1988, 38). 
This is not to suggest that NAMFREL was a one-man show. Instead, what I want to 
emphasize is both the reformist agenda of the organization, and the important role played 
by groups not usually identified with social activism. This dual character gives a hint to the 
kind of specimen the monitoring of elections would evolve into at the international level. 
And it is precisely when international actors entered the scene in the Philippines that both 
the domestic effort was potentiated, through boomerang effect, and that an IEM TAN was 
born. 
The support foreign actors, mainly U.S. actors, gave to the opposition forces and 
NAMFREL was crucial.  To begin with, as noted, the United States changed its position 
vis-à-vis the Philippine government by the mid-1980s. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee’s chairman, Senator Richard G. Lugar, led an unprecedented election 
monitoring mission to the Philippines. Right from the start, his assessment of the electoral 
context was far from complacent. Lugar accused Marcos of attempting to manipulate the 
electoral process (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1991, 117). In 
parallel, the U.S Embassy in Manila maintained close contact with NAMFREL throughout 
the period leading to the snap elections (Hedman 2001, 183). As Thomas Carothers has 
noted regarding the change in US foreign policy that took place in the mid 1980s: ‘The 
Philippines was the crucial first case’ (Carothers 1999, 37). 
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But official U.S support for the democratic forces came late, and was wavering. Right after 
the rigged electoral process, for instance, Reagan declared that fraud had taken place on 
both sides.  Consequently, as Anja Jetschke notes, ‘until late 1985 the US administration 
largely followed events in the Philippines, rather than actively shaping them’ (Jetschke 
1999, 153). However, at the request of Senators Lugar and Clairbone Pell, the Center for 
Democracy sent a preliminary delegation to the Philippines. In its report, the Center 
established a set of requirements they considered critical in evaluating the 7 February 
electoral process.  Among these, was the accreditation of NAMFREL as a pollwatching 
organization (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1991, 8). 
More decisive, although equally late, was the support provided by other organizations, 
especially that of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). 
Founded in 1983, it is one of the four core grantees of the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), established the same year. Although the NED is mostly funded from 
congressional appropriations, it operates autonomously from the executive branch of the 
U.S. government (Diamond 1992, 39). NDI receives most of its resources from the NED as 
does its counterpart the National Republican Institute for International Affairs (NRIIA). 
Thus, both can be thought of as quasi-governmental organizations.  NDI began its activities 
in the Philippines in January 1986.6 It is worth noting that Marcos himself, at the same time 
he went on U.S. TV to announce the snap elections, had noted that international observers 
would be welcome. This was undoubtedly a strategic move by Marcos, who calculated that 
he could win the election, and that foreign observers, given the short interval before the 
elections, would not be able to denounce eventual irregularities. Nevertheless, as the 
delegation’s final report consigns, during their first meeting with members of the 
Commission of Elections ‘several commissioners explicitly warned against ‘foreign 
interference”’ (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1991, 9). 
Furthermore, before the delegation left Manila on 11 January, the Commission passed a 
resolution, Rules and Regulations against Foreign Intervention, which established that 
foreign observers could not be within 50 meters of the voting tables (10). 
 
6 The mission was organized jointly with the NDI/NRIIA, but the final report was written by a NDI staff-
member (Larry Garber), and published by NDI. 
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COMELEC’s hostility did not reflect the general mood toward observers, though. Both 
presidential candidates and NAMFREL welcomed them. Thus, a 44-member NDI-NRIIA 
delegation, headed by British parliamentarian John Hume and Colombian former President 
Misael Pastrana, arrived in Philippines 12 days before the election (National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs 1991, 11). In their short stay, delegation members were 
able to witness plenty of irregularities. The delegation issued its highly critical preliminary 
findings on February 9, two days after the election. The official U.S. observer delegation 
was also highly critical, and eventually even the Reagan administration openly chastised 
the Marcos regime for the handling of the electoral process (13). All the negative foreign 
publicity, Steven Rood noted, prevented the election from serving one of its purposes, that 
of ensuring foreign support for the Marcos regime (Rood 1987, 9). 
But the determining factor in Marcos’s failure was home grown. The day before the 
Batasang Pambansa (Philippine Congress) declared Marcos the winner, the Catholic 
Bishops Conference denounced the elections as ‘the most fraudulent in Philippine history,’ 
while NAMFREL’s Joe Con declared that ‘Never has a more vigilant populace witnessed a 
more pervasive travesty upon the sanctity of the ballot box in our history’ (National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1991, 14). As the civic group would put it in 
its report: ‘NAMFREL believes that the overall outcome as officially proclaimed by the 
Batasang Pambansa is a complete mockery of the right of suffrage and does not reflect the 
true will of the Filipino people’ (4). 
The reformist movement would have quite a momentous ending. After Marcos’s refusal to 
accept his defeat, an aborted military coup and counter coup took place, prompting hundred 
of thousands of Philippines to the street to form a human shield to protect the reformist 
soldiers (Hedman 2001, 185). Finally, on 25 February, after an arrangement worked out 
with U.S. Senator Paul Laxalt, Marcos left the Philippines for exile in Hawaii (National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1991, 15-6). 
As the previous narrative suggests, the bulk of the monitoring effort in the 1986 electoral 
process in the Philippines was carried out by domestic actors. Without NAMFREL, foreign 
observers would have probably just been used by the Marcos regime. Not because they 
would have wanted to be its accomplices, but because if to the short period they spent in the 
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country, we add the absence of a well-organized domestic counterpart, their effectiveness 
would have certainly decreased.  This is not to suggest that international observers were 
superfluous. Far from it. NAMFREL enthusiastically supported their presence, and 
eventually got 800 of them accredited (Byington 1988, 189). NAMFREL also received 
financial support, approximately $1 million, from foreign donors. Among them were the 
United States Agency for International Development, and the NED (Hedman 2001, 183). 
The defining feature of the Philippine experience was then the interaction between 
domestic and international actors in a novel arena; election watching. It was this extremely 
successful interaction that made the international monitoring of elections acquire certain 
modularity (Hedman 2001, 29). As the NDI-NRII report notes, ‘As a result of the 
Philippine experience, there has been increased attention on the role of the international 
community in supporting democratic development in different countries (National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1991, 2).’ The Philippines would then 
become a foundational experience for IEM in general and for the NDI in particular. Thus, 
as a result of its involvement in the Asian archipelago, D. Stoelting has noted, ‘the National 
Democratic Institute has emerged as the most prominent NGO in the election observation 
field (Stoelting 1992, 423).’ For NDI, ‘NAMFREL [has served] as a model for organizing 
individuals who are not politically active and sensitizing them to political issues in a 
manner that will not arouse their fears’ (National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs 1991, 75). 
One might thus argue that the origins of the IEM TAN might be found in the Philippines. 
At the time the snap election took place, actors working internationally had not yet 
established a ‘dense exchange of information and services’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 217), 
that would allow us to refer to it as an international network. A still not fully articulated 
international norm, the right to free and fair elections, materialized for the first time in the 
Philippines, and became then a more concrete referent for state and nonstate actors. There 
was certainly a critical mass of people, mainly in the Philippines and the United States, that 
allowed the boomerang pattern to take place. But it was only because a well-organized 
domestic network of activists threw the boomerang in the first place, that it picked up 
strength from the Americas before coming back to the Philippines. 
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Chile 1988 
The Philippine election monitoring effort was an important referent for the 5 October 1988 
Chilean plebiscite. Heraldo Muñoz, a Chilean who participated in an NDI’s IEM mission to 
the Philippines summarized it well in the title of an article he wrote in 1987: ‘Lesson From 
the Philippines: Organization and Participation in Free Elections’ (cited in National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1991, 81). 
The 1988 plebiscite in Chile was held in accordance with the 1980 Constitution approved 
by the junta (whose members had overthrown the democratically elected government of 
Salvador Allende in 1973). According to the new legislation, General Pinochet was named 
President of the Republic for an eight-year term, but sometime before the end of that term, 
the government was required to conduct a plebiscite in which the electorate would be asked 
to accept or reject the government’s presidential candidate. A ‘Yes’ victory would then 
mean the government’s candidate serving another eight-year term, after which multi-
candidate elections would be held. A ‘No’ victory, on the other hand, would mean that 
Pinochet would remain in office for one more year, and would be required to hold multi-
candidate elections ninety days before his term came to an end. The plebiscite was thus not 
an election. This protracted and controlled mechanism was one of the pillars of what 
Pinochet claimed his regime was creating for the well-being of his fellow citizens, a system 
of ‘protected democracy.’ 
Thus, on 30 August, when the junta announced both the date for the plebiscite and that 
General Pinochet would be the name people would cast their ballot for or against, the 
opposition had already gone a long way in negotiating a common front: the Concertación 
de Partidos por el NO (Association of Parties for the NO). The Concertación represented 
the coming together of 15 (eventually 16) political parties of diverse political orientations 
with one objective: ‘to defeat Pinochet and the regime in the plebiscite’ (Aylwin Azócar 
1998, 341). 
Paralleling the mobilization of the political class, civic, religious, and human rights activists 
also joined forces. The aim of such a convergence was twofold: first, to organize a drive for 
voter registration, and, second, to monitor the electoral process. As in the Philippine 
experience, this effort was substantially home grown. But also as in the case across the 
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Pacific, the synergy created by the coming together of domestic and external activists 
potentiated the effectiveness of the endeavour. Furthermore, their mere association with 
foreign actors became a sort of ‘insurance’ for Chilean activists, since it made it more 
onerous for the government to retaliate against them. 
Thus, the Cruzada por la Participación Ciudadana (Crusade for Civic Participation, also 
known as CIVITAS), was formed in March 1988 to encourage voters to participate in the 
plebiscite. CIVITAS also cooperated with another civic organization in conducting a quick 
count on election day (Nevitte 1997, 52). Likewise, the Catholic Church’s Vicaría de la 
Solidaridad (Vicariate of Solidarity) was very active not only in human rights issues but 
also on those related to the transition process.  It became a focal point for foreign observers 
of the plebiscite.  Similarly, Chilean intellectuals played a very important role in the months 
leading to the plebiscite, both in the political campaign against the regime properly, and in 
the monitoring of the plebiscite itself. As Jeffrey Puryear has amply documented, the 
financial and technical support these intellectuals received from foreign donors became 
instrumental in the successful transition to democracy in Chile (Puryear, 1994). 
But it wasn’t only the intellectuals who received external assistance. During 1988, NDI 
administered a $1 million fund to support the democratic transition in Chile (National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1988, 7). Thus, it provided grants for civic 
education and monitoring to civic organizations, such as CIVITAS. Furthermore, this time 
multiple international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), such as the International 
Human Rights Law Group, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Latin American 
Studies Association, America’s Watch, NRIIA, and NDI sent delegations to monitor the 
plebiscite. Of these, the most conspicuous, both for the resources at its disposal, and for the 
profile of its members, was the last one. With two former presidents among its leaders, 
Adolfo Suárez of Spain, and Misael Pastrana of Colombia, NDI’s delegation consisted of 
55 members (iii). In the time between the Philippine snap election and the Chilean 
plebiscite, NDI had been actively involved building bridges between civic organizations of 
the two countries. Thus, for instance, two NAMFREL members took part in a November 
1987 workshop in Santiago, sponsored by NDI, dealing with issues of voter registration and 
mobilization. Similarly, a month and a half before the plebiscite, NAMFREL specialists 
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went to Chile to oversee the monitoring efforts of civic the Command for the NO and of the 
Committee for Free Elections (83). 
The presence of foreign observers in Chile elicited contradictory responses. On the one 
hand, the opposition forces and civil groups openly welcomed their presence. The 
Committee for Free Elections, for instance, sent a letter to NDI welcoming the presence of 
its delegation because it demonstrated ‘international support for a free and fair plebiscite’ 
(reproduced in National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 1988, 70). The 
Chilean government on the other hand, had a rather ambivalent position vis-à-vis the 
presence of observers. Some senior officials, including Pinochet himself, several times 
complained that the presence of foreign observers was an intervention in domestic affairs. 
Thus, in a diplomatic note sent by the Foreign Ministry to foreign diplomats accredited in 
Chile in May 1988 the Chilean government stated that it would ‘not recognize for any 
foreign citizen the attributes of “inspector”, “comptroller” or “examining observer.”’ But 
the Chilean authorities also made clear in the same dispatch that ‘foreign citizens may 
witness the development of the election acts in which voters recognized by the political 
constitution and legislation are participating’ (20). In the end, the government did not raise 
obstacles to international observers. This, of course, was not just a gratuitous concession by 
the military regime. What Darren Hawkins has noted about human rights applies as well to 
the right to democratic government in Chile:  
In countries where human rights norms are more firmly established, either by historical precedent or 
by a growing diffusion throughout civil society, authoritarian elites have greater difficulty evading 
international pressures. To demonstrate their legitimacy, they must adopt the language of human rights 
and claim some adherence to human rights standards rather than simply arguing, as do many Asian 
regimes, that Westernized international norms do not apply (Hawkins 1997, 409). 
The Pinochet regime did indeed embrace the democracy discourse, beginning with its 
already noted self-characterization as a ‘protected democracy.’ 
In any case, by this time two things were clear: first, that national elections were in the 
process of becoming international affairs. As former Adolfo Suárez put it in the foreword to 
the NDI’s report on the Chilean plebiscite, ‘The recent Chilean plebiscite, although 
formally an internal matter falling within the sovereign rights of Chile, also had an 
international dimension of major relevance’ (National Democratic Institute for International 
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Affairs 1988, v); second, that an IEM TAN was in the process of consolidation.  As Paul 
Drake has observed, ‘The Chilean democratic forces tapped into a global network of 
activists in factor of democracy and human rights’ (Drake 1994, 28). 
One more element in the international environment played in favour of the democratic 
(partisan and non-partisan) forces in Chile: the change in United States policy toward the 
Pinochet regime. The open support of the United States to the military government since its 
inception had been a general rule (with the partial exception of the Carter years).  The 
change in policy that began to take place in 1985 was all the more surprising given the 
zealous support the Reagan administration was bent on providing to anti-Communist 
regimes, such as Pinochet’s—regardless of their democratic credentials or human rights 
record.  Nevertheless, in March 1986 Secretary of State George Shultz referred to Chile as 
one of the Western hemisphere’s ‘odd men out’ (along with Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
Paraguay), and the US ambassador to Chile, Harry G. Barnes, prepared a draft resolution 
for the UN Human Rights Commission condemning Pinochet’s human rights record 
(Dogget 1988, 29, 31).  As time went by, the bilateral relationship deteriorated, and the 
issue of the plebiscite acquired unprecedented salience. The U.S Congress established the 
Committee to Support Free Elections in Chile, under the joint presidency of Democratic 
Senator Edward Kennedy and Republican Senator Richard Lugar. The Committee also 
included former presidents James Carter and Gerald Ford (Muñoz and Portales 1991, 97). 
Thus, drawing on a rich associational life tradition, and with the decided support of foreign 
actors, Chileans working against the Pinochet regime were able to build an impressive 
organization for plebiscite day.7 They achieved voter registration of 92 percent. On 5 
October, all 22,131 polling places were monitored (Valenzuela 1989, 130), and a turnout of 
registered voters of 97 percent occurred (National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs 1988, 1). The ‘No’ option won with 55 percent of the votes.  Whether or nor the 
Pinochet regime had contemplated stealing the election in case of adverse results, it is clear 
 
7 Interestingly, the traditionally well-organized popular sectors played only a marginal role during the 
transition.  As Philip Oxhorn has noted, ‘as the possibility of an actual transition to democracy became 
increasingly imminent in 1987 and 1988, political parties joined together to dismantle the [popular social] 
movement as part of the collective effort to secure the transition (Oxhorn 1995, 280).’ 
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that the vast network of domestic and international monitors contributed to making that 
possibility extremely remote. 
Nicaragua 1990 
By the time the 25 February 1990 Nicaraguan elections took place, the IEM TAN was 
already established.  Paradoxically, though, in this case nonstate actors played a secondary 
role in monitoring the electoral process. The main role fell to two IGOs: the Organization 
of American States (OAS), and the United Nations (UN).  Since overthrowing the Somoza 
regime in 1979, the Sandinistas had had a difficult relationship with the United States. At 
first, under the Carter administration, which promoted a less interventionist foreign policy, 
and placed more emphasis on the promotion of human rights, the bilateral relationship 
seemed manageable. But the arrival of Ronald Reagan at the White House changed 
everything.  Convinced that the Sandinistas were communists who represented a direct 
threat not only to the isthmus but also to the United States, the Reagan administration did 
not hesitate to fight a proxy-war against the revolutionary regime. The United States 
government thus began funding the ‘Contras,’ putting pressure on the Honduran 
government so its territory could serve as a base for what Reagan used to call ‘freedom 
fighters.’ 
By the second half of the 1980s, it became evident that neither the Sandinistas nor the U.S. 
government was going to prevail. For the Sandinistas, the situation was of course 
particularly delicate, since the political and economic conditions of their country were 
going from bad to worse. But the problem was not limited to the bilateral relationship, or to 
Nicaragua. It had become a problem for the whole Central American region. Thus, in the 
framework of the regional peace plan known as Esquipulas II Agreement, the five Central 
American presidents committed themselves in 1987 to ‘promote an authentic democratic 
process that is pluralistic and participatory, which entails the promotion of social justice 
and respect for human rights.’  Furthermore, the presidents also committed themselves ‘to 
invite the Organization of American States (and) the United Nations... to send observers to 
verify that the electoral process is fair and free’ (Beigbeder 1994,165). As Jennifer McCoy, 
Larry Garber, and Robert Pastor have pointed out, Esquipulas Agreement  ‘represented a 
conceptual breakthrough in international relations, slicing through the cord connecting 
 Alongside these highly visible teams, there were a myriad of INGOs monitoring the 
electoral process. There were nearly 2000 accredited foreign observers from over 200 
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internal strife and external intervention by dealing with both dimensions of the conflict at 
the same time’ (McCoy, Garber et al. 1991, 103). 
On March 1989 Nicaragua made an official request to the Secretary-General of the UN to 
send a mission of observers to its February 1990 elections. Four months later, the 
Secretary-General made public his decision to establish the UN Observer Mission to verify 
the electoral process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN). In communicating it to the General 
Assembly, the Secretary-General was careful to stress that although the UN had supervised 
elections in the context of decolonisation, it had not been its practice to do so in sovereign 
states. Furthermore, he pointed out that ‘on a number of occasions over the years, we have 
declined invitations from Member States to that effect’ (cited in Franck 1992, 80). 
This was in fact the first time that the UN would observe a national election in a sovereign 
country, since the isolated 1977 observing mission to Panama had dealt with a referendum 
on an international treaty. Thus, the Secretary-General justified acceding to the Nicaraguan 
request in terms of it being part of the Central American peace plan (Franck 1992, 80). 
Similarly, in approving the creation of ONUVEN the General Assembly noted that this was 
an ‘extraordinary measure,’ one that was justified only by its relation to the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the region.  Furthermore, the General Assembly stated 
explicitly that no precedent was being created with this operation (Beigbeder 1994, 166). 
The UN and the OAS thus established the largest and most comprehensive electoral 
observation mission ever in a sovereign country. The OAS team alone consisted of 433 
observers. This amounted to an impressive quantitative and qualitative difference compared 
to previous OAS observation efforts, in which only a few distinguished persons were sent 
to provide what was symbolic support for democratic reform. Although cooperation 
between the UN and the OAS teams was not always easy (Pastor 1990, 18), the extent to 
which both organizations got involved in lending credibility to the February 1990 electoral 
process in Nicaragua was unprecedented. The UN and the OAS became central actors in 
the electoral process. 
 NGOs present in Nicaragua on election day (Pastor 1990). Among the organizations which 
sent missions were: Hemispheres Initiatives, Center for Democracy, International Human 
Rights Law Group, Washington Office for Latin America, and the Carter Center.8 
Interestingly, NDI did not send a delegation to Nicaragua (although that same year it sent 
missions to Bulgaria, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Haiti). Nevertheless, 
several of its leaders provided advice to the Carter Center’s delegation, and a NDI staff 
member took a temporary leave to join the Center’s mission (Carter Center 1990, 10). With 
a permanent representative in Nicaragua since late 1989, the Carter Center’s mission 
eventually came to have 34 members. Among them was Genaro Arriagada, the former 
spokesman of Chile’s Concertación de Partidos por el NO. The presence of Arriagada 
underscores the permanence of the TAN born in the Philippines four years before. 
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But undoubtedly the most important member of the delegation was the person after whom 
the Center was named; James Carter. As a widely respected former U.S. president, Carter 
was in a privileged position. He was able to act as a mediator not only between his 
country’s government and Nicaragua’s, but also between the Sandinistas and the 
opposition, whose bulk coalesced around the candidacy of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro 
(the widow of the slain journalist Joaquín Chamorro). And Carter did indeed act as a 
mediator between the government and the opposition—but not only during the electoral 
campaign. During the transition period, from the moment when Ortega recognized his 
defeat at the polls, and until Chamorro took power on 25 April, both leaders looked to the 
former president to guarantee a smooth transfer of power (Pastor 1990). 
Four points are worth highlighting about the Nicaraguan experience: 
 The fact that IGOs played the most visible role in monitoring the electoral process is 
significant for what it says about the institutionalisation of a practice largely initiated by 
a TAN. It was precisely the Nicaragua precedent that encouraged the OAS to create in 
1991 the Democratic Promotion Unit.  Since its establishment, the Unit has undertaken 
37 electoral monitoring missions in over half of the OAS member states (OAS). 
 
8 The Carter Center’s mission was organized under the umbrella of the ‘Council of Freely Elected Heads of 
Government,’ but since the staff, resources, and even the idea for the Council itself came from the Carter 
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Following the steps of the regional organization, the United Nations (UN) created in 
1992 the Electoral Assistance Unit, which since that time has been involved in more 
that 100 electoral processes world-wide;9 
 A single NGO, the Carter Center, played an exceptionally important role during the 
electoral process and afterwards. This was in large part due to its unique nature (i.e., 
that it was founded and directed by a former U.S. president), but also to the fact that the 
Carter Center built on NDI’s ‘model’ for observing elections (Carter Center 1990, 10). 
This fact underscores the evolution of the IEM TAN, one that had started only a few 
years earlier in the Philippines; 
 The copious presence of foreign observers (over 2000) drives home the point that an 
IEM TAN was perfectly well established by 1990. That is, at this time Sikkink’s 
requirement ‘to speak meaningfully of a network,’ that ‘enough actors must exist and be 
connected’ (Sikkink 1993,416), was met; 
 The monitoring effort relied entirely on foreign actors: the elections were not monitored 
by domestic groups. This rather paradoxical feature of the Nicaraguan case underscores 
the international bias of the network literature. This bias, I would argue, is concomitant 
with the tendency to focus on the impact of international norms on domestic politics. 
The Nicaraguan peculiarity, I suggest, might be explained by two factors. First, in 
contrast to Chile, where the democratic tradition had accompanied (or built upon) a rich 
associational life, Nicaragua’s history was certainly not notable for either of those 
features. No democratic tradition or rich associational life existed in Nicaragua. Second, 
the polarization of political life in Nicaragua was such that it made the emergence of a 
civic, non-partisan monitoring group very difficult.  It would not be until 1996 that a 
Nicaraguan organization, Ética y Transparencia, first monitored domestic elections.  
Tellingly, NDI, and through it the IEM TAN, was instrumental in the emergence of this 
organization.10 
Center, I refer to the mission as the Center’s and not the Council’s. By doing this, I want to point out, I do not 
intend to belittle the valuable contribution of the Council’s members. 
9 The Unit was upgraded to Division in 1994. The data come form the Division's web page. 
10 Interview with Melvin Estrada, Executive Secretary of Ética y Transparencia, Managua, 8 October 2001. 
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Mexico 1994 
It was not until 1994, with the 21 August Presidential elections in Mexico, that the 
convergence of the three vectors—international actors, domestic civil society, and IGOs—
took place. In a way, the story comes full circle in this case. On the international front, it is 
worth noting that Mexico had traditionally been (at least until 1993) one of the staunchest 
supporters in the international arena of the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.  
For instance, when in 1992 the OAS General Assembly voted to amend the charter so that a 
government which overthrows a democratic regime can be suspended from the 
organization, Mexico cast the only dissenting vote (Millet 1994, 14). As late as December 
1993, in UN resolution 48/124, Mexico expressed its opposition to foreign election 
monitors (Benitez Manaut 1996, 541). 
The Mexican government's concern with foreign observation was a sign of the times. 
Significantly, it was a non-issue only a decade before. Thus, for instance, in 1988, when 
election monitoring was not yet a prominent issue in the international arena, it was not an 
issue in Mexico's presidential election that year either. But after the uproar caused by the 
fraudulent elections of that year, which was an implicit endorsement of the electoral path, 
involvement in electoral issues entered the agenda of domestic NGOs. Significantly, 
though, it was only after the head of the non-governmental Mexican Human Rights 
Commission, Sergio Aguayo, was invited by the Carter Center to observe the 1990 Haitian 
elections, that the idea of domestically monitoring Mexican elections emerged. As Aguayo 
puts it: ‘monitoring by outside observers seemed to me an effective way to promote fair 
elections, but I found that exercise expensive, and not enough in any case to consolidate a 
culture of democracy. The logical alternative for Mexico was electoral observation by the 
country's own citizens (Aguayo Quezada 1995, 158). 
Although Aguayo’s preference for domestic observers was more a pragmatic than 
principled issue, the mere possibility of external monitoring aroused suspicion in the 
Mexican government. In October 1990, Mexico’s Foreign Minister declared that the 
country's problems regarding democracy would need to be solved by Mexicans ‘and not by 
importing specialized observers from Atlanta or Milwaukee who tell us how to do things’ 
(quoted in Chabat 1991, 14). As Jorge Chabat put it at the time, ‘it would seem as though 
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the Mexican states's [sic] traditional concept of sovereignty has found its last refuge in the 
ballot box’ (17). 
With a grant from Canada's International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development, the Mexican Academy for Human Rights was able to put a 300-observer 
team for the 18 August 1991 elections in San Luis Potosí. This was the first case of election 
monitoring in Mexico. Between then and 1993, the Academy and other NGOs monitored 
15 local elections. As the practice of domestic monitoring began to spread, the issues of 
inviting foreign observers reappeared more forcefully. Some NGOs invited observers to 
watch local elections without government consent. This was the case of some Canadian 
legislators who observed the 1992 elections in the states of Michoacán and Morelos. The 
pressure on the Salinas administration to reconsider its position on foreign monitors began 
to increase. 
But the Mexican government remained firm. Although the 1993 electoral reform for the 
first time legislated on the issue of domestic observers, recognizing them as legitimate 
actors in the electoral process, foreign observers remained explicitly banned from it.  In 
October 1993, on the eve of the formal start of the 1994 presidential race, Foreign Minister 
Fernando Solana declared: ‘the Mexican government will not allow foreign observers in the 
electoral processes, only Mexican observers. The most fundamental exercise of sovereignty 
are the elections, which should always be in the hands of the citizens of Mexico’ (quoted n 
Benitez Manaut 1996, 539). Nevertheless, once again foreign observers defied the 
government's policy. The Carter Center, for instance, sent a mission when the presidential 
campaigns started. 
It was in this context of increased domestic and international pressure that the Mexican 
government, at the UN General Assembly, in December 1993, reiterated its opposition to 
the participation of foreigners in the electoral processes of other countries. But a few weeks 
later, when the peasant uprising in Chiapas broke out, the political environment in Mexico 
changed so dramatically that the government was forced to make concessions on several 
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In March 1994, Mexico’s ambassador to the UN declared that accepting foreign observers 
‘does not mean abandonment of sovereignty, but declaring that there is nothing to hide and 
that electoral processes in Mexico can be observed freely (quoted in Benitez Manaut 1996, 
547).’ By that time, in stark contrast to the Nicaraguan case, the work of domestic NGOs to 
mount a massive observation campaign was well under way. Civic Alliance/Observation 
1994, an umbrella organization that came to unite more than 300 NGOs, was legally 
constituted in April 1994. Earlier that month, several of its founding organizations had 
approached the National Endowment for Democracy to request funds. In the months 
leading to elections, the Mexican Academy for Human Rights and the Washington Office 
on Latin America elaborated a report on the forthcoming elections, calling their joint effort 
‘one symbol of the growing desire of civil society in Mexico and the United States to 
promote more democratic and humane societies’ (Dresser 1995, 330). 
At that point the Salinas administration was aware that there was nothing it could do to 
prevent the presence of foreign observers.  As a former adviser to the then Interior Minister 
put it:  
it soon became clear that contrary to the Mexican government’s sentiments, international observers 
would be in Mexico, despite the absence of supervision by Mexican electoral authorities or rules 
governing their behaviour. The risk of diplomatic incidents resulting from the activities of international 
observers could not be ignored.  For example, what would happen if the Carter Center decided to send 
an observation mission and it was expelled from Mexico under Article 33 of the Constitution? 
(Alcocer 1997,699).11 
Thus, in April the Mexican government informally invited the UN to provide assistance for 
the forthcoming elections. Significantly, the Mexican request to the UN omitted the issue of 
foreign observers. The Mexican government wanted the UN to play an indirect role in the 
monitoring of the elections. Its task was confined to two areas; to elaborate an analysis of 
the political and legal conditions of the electoral process, and to provide technical 
assistance to national NGOs engaged in election monitoring. The UN provided technical 
and financial assistance (between 2.5 and 3 million dollars) to 16 organizations, of which 
the most conspicuous was Civic Alliance. Although both kinds of assistance proved 
valuable, its significance was of a different order. As Sergio Aguayo, one of the most 
prominent leaders of Civic Alliance put it, ‘the greatest contribution of the outside world 
was the recognition that it granted to the Civic Alliance as a legitimate representative of the 
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Mexican society’ (Aguayo Quezada 1995, 162). This is reminiscent of NAMFREL’s status 
as COMELEC’s ‘citizen arm.’ But UN recognition went not only to Civic Alliance, but 
also, as I noted above, to 15 other election-watching organizations. Thus, with their 
function recognized in the amended electoral laws, and with the support of the UN, 81,620 
domestic observers registered at the IFE for the presidential elections. 
Finally, facing increasing external pressure from several NGOs, the Mexican government 
decided to allow the presence of ‘foreign visitors’ (the euphemism used to refer to foreign 
observers).  According to Aguayo, the Salinas administration ‘came to realize that it needed 
a certificate of “good democratic conduct” from the outside world’ (Aguayo Quezada 1995: 
162). Thus, on 23 June 1994 the IFE issued the guidelines for international visitors. 
Significantly, a former advisor to the Minister of the Interior has recognized that the 
existence of the UN Electoral Assistance Division played an instrumental role in the 
government’s acceptance of ‘international visitors’ (Alcocer 1997,702). In the absence of 
an UN institution, whose establishment was in part made possible by the existence of an 
IEM TAN, the Mexican government would have been unlikely to accept international 
monitors.  Among the organizations that sent missions to the 1994 Mexican elections were 
the Washington Office on Latin America, Equal Exchange, the Carter Center (in 
association with NDI and IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 
Ultimately, 777 foreign observers registered with the IFE attended the electoral process. 
Significantly, more than half of them were affiliated with Civic Alliance. 
As in the Philippines eight years earlier, domestic actors were at the forefront of the 
monitoring effort; but as in Chile six years earlier, the input of foreign nonstate actors was 
vital to the domestic monitoring effort; and as in Nicaragua four years before, the 
involvement of IGOs gave the involvement of external nonstate actors an aura of 
legitimacy. Beyond being the first instance when all these factors converged, the 
distinguishing feature of the Mexican case was the reluctance of the Mexican state to be 
engaged in this kind of practice—a reluctance that, without the presence of the IEM TAN, 
would have most likely not been overcome. 
11 Article 33 states that ‘Foreigners will not be allowed, in any way, to interfere in domestic political matters.’ 
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Concluding Remarks 
As the trajectory of the IEM TAN shows, the right to free and fair elections had become an 
issue of international concern by the late 1980s. This concern, however, was primarily 
manifested by nonstate actors working internationally. By rescuing from the domestic cum 
international system a basic element that had lain dormant at least since the bipolar world 
was inaugurated, these nonstate actors foreshadowed the changes to come with the end of 
the Cold War.  
It was precisely the synergy created by domestic and transnational actors that made the 
rapid consolidation of the IEM TAN possible. But what is more remarkable about this 
network is the way it contributed to the redefinition of the issue it implies: sovereignty. By 
making explicit that the people’s right to free and fair elections (and more fundamentally, 
to democratic governance) transcends state boundaries, the IEM TAN promoted an 
understanding of sovereignty in international relations that, while not novel, had fallen into 
oblivion. IEM activists were thus recuperating the social nature of sovereignty—even at the 
international level. The international system has been partially altered by the practice of 
nonstate actors. But this has not been an anti-state quarrel. On the contrary, the activities of 
the IEM TAN can be seen as state affirming; their aim is to make the world be constituted 
by the right kind of states, not by organization other than states, or a world government.  
The IEM TAN directly engages the state. 
This feature makes the IEM TAN unique. It differentiates it, for instance, from what Paul 
Wapner has called ‘world civil politics.’ In this practice, ‘NGOs turn their gaze away from 
the state system and concentrate on other entities within global civil society to win support 
and the instantiation of their goals’ (Wapner 2000, 272; my italics). It is clear that the IEM 
TAN did not look away, even for a moment, from the state system. This TAN is also 
different from what Sidney Tarrow considers would be the effect of potential transnational 
movements: to ‘challenge the continued autonomy, sovereignty and control by the national 
state over its own territory’ (Tarrow 1996, 6). The IEM TAN was not challenging state 
sovereignty. This issue brings me back to my initial discussion about social movements. 
Oftentimes the effect of thinking of TANs as GSMs is to put them in an inherently 
adversarial position vis-à-vis the states and the state system. But this disposition is not 
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intrinsic to most kinds of transnational activism; it is, in any case, an empirical matter of the 
issue in question. Yet more fundamental is the fact that a functional equivalent of the 
domestic POS is absent at the international level. Without a POS to host it, a global social 
movement remains an abstraction. Thus, what most international campaigns concentrate on 
are specific domestic structures. This is not to deny the importance of international regimes, 
but the fact remains that as the constitutive elements and ultimate enforces of those 
regimes, states remain the central actors—and the focal point for transnational action. It 
could perhaps be argued that the current GSMs are simply a decentralized version of their 
traditional homologues. Since most nonstate transnational activity, that of the IEM TAN 
included, does indeed confront a domestic POS, it would seem that the ‘decentralized 
GSM’ idea is well founded. There is some validity to this argument. But again, 
international interaction is generally episodic (and generally it does not involve public 
protest), thus making its conception as a GSM misleading. One thing is clear: there is no 
global POS for GSMs to hold on to. 
What the international system does embody, though, are constitutive elements whose seed 
can be brought into life globally. That is what the path of norm-diffusion I suggested above 
is all about. Had the popular cum territorial notion of sovereignty been absent from the 
international system, the IEM TAN would not have thrived in the way it did. In this 
particular case, the number of states supporting the emergent norm (IEM), or the fact that 
its main players were not ‘critical’ states, was secondary. The gist of the emergent norm 
was so fundamental that it was difficult for both states and IGOs to reject it. The Mexican 
experience of 1994 is a clear illustration of this. 
But the case of the IEM TAN might, after all, be over determined. Many factors, among 
them the end of the Cold War and the acquiescence of the remaining superpower, 
undoubtedly contributed to its rapid institutionalisation at the international level. The third 
way of norm diffusion I suggested might, therefore, be of more theoretical than of empirical 
relevance. It is still important, I would like to think, to keep it in mind when pondering how 
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